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Introduction 
 
The linkage between operations management and financial performance is not well 
understood in most supply chains.  We used public financial data from a large number of 
retailers to explore the drivers of differences in, and thereby understand the tradeoffs between, 
gross margins and other metrics--such as inventory turns and selling, general and administrative 
expenses.  We examine the effect of changes in “management measures” -- such as return on 
assets, variance in return on assets, and growth rate -- on long-term stock market performance 
and show how these measures can be used to benchmark performance across industry segments.  
Our analysis contributes both a better understanding of retail operations and a methodology that 
can be used to discover similar relationships in other supply chains. 
 
Consider the following questions. 
 
Question 1    Had you invested $1,000 in Wal-Mart (“Wal-Mart”) stock at the close of 
trading on December 31, 1978, it would have grown to $173,000 by the end of 
December 31, 1997 (adjusted for dividends and splits). A similar amount invested in Gap 
Inc. (“Gap”) would have grown to $136,000 and in Circuit City Stores Inc. (“Circuit 
City”) to $278,000. Had you instead invested indiscriminately in retail stocks in 
December 1978, roughly 17% of the firms in which you invested would have filed for 
bankruptcy before December 1997. What explains this wide variation in stock market 
performance? 
Question 2    To what extent can variation in retail stocks be explained by differences in 
management measures1 such as sales growth rate, inventory turns, and gross margins? 
Better stock market performance might be expected to result from better management 
measures, yet the relationship is in many cases not straightforward. Consider that during 
the years 1986 to 1995 sales growth for Best Buy Inc. (“Best Buy”) was 47% per year 
and for Tandy Corporation2 (“Tandy”) only 7.5% per year.  Yet the ROA during that 
period was only 11.5% for Best Buy and 20.5% for Tandy. Which company paid higher 
stock returns? 
                                                                 
1 We use the term “management measures” to denote metrics that managers are often rewarded on. Thus, managers 
often attempt to control these metrics. 
2  Radio Shack is part of Tandy Corporation. 
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Question 3    Finally, how do the different management measures relate to one another? 
Are high turns typically accompanied by low gross margins, for example, or gross 
margins correlated with SG&A expenses?  Can we conclude from the Best Buy-Tandy 
example that high sales growth is generally associated with lower ROA? 
The relationships among management measures are central to deriving suitable 
benchmarks for assessing corporate performance.  If, for example, the grocery chain 
Kroger Company (“Kroger”) had average inventory turns of 14 and Gap average 
inventory turns of 7 over the past 15 years, might we reasonably conclude that Kroger 
managed its inventory better than Gap? Or, if Best Buy had inventory turns of 4 and 
Tandy Corp. inventory turns of 1.8, would Best Buy be the better inventory manager?  
How are retailers most effectively compared within and across retail industry segments? 
 
As researchers in supply chain management, we are concerned with measures that are 
affected by supply chain management practices (e.g., demand forecasting, inventory 
management) related to asset utilization and product availability, namely, sales growth, inventory 
turns, gross margins, and return on assets.  We do not consider measures such as capital 
structure, which, although important to stock market valuation, are not directly affected by 
supply chain management practices. Our interest being in how CEOs can influence long-term 
shareholder value by manipulating variables that are at least partially under their control, we 
emphasize long-term stock returns (i.e., over a period of nineteen years), over short-term 
fluctuations in stock price. 
Whether the stock market rewards operating performance is a question that has been asked 
not only in retail, but more broadly. The relationship between long-term stock market 
performance and management performance has not been systematically studied generally, hence 
a methodology developed for retailers that can be applied to distributors and manufacturers as 
well is likely to prove extremely useful. 
Characterizing Retailer Performance from 1978 to 1997 
We used stock market data drawn from the Compustat and Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) databases to identify patterns in retail stock market performance between 1978 
and 1997. Figure 1 plots a histogram of the compounded annualized stock returns of all public-
listed retail firms during this period.  To ensure that the data would be representative of long-
term retailer performance, we included in our analysis only firms that had public data for at least 
two years. We adjusted all returns for dividends and stock-splits. For firms that had been 
publicly traded for more than 2 but less than 19 years, we computed returns based on the 
available data (e.g., we computed for a firm that had been public from 1985 to 1994, we 
computed returns for that period) 
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Our analysis revealed that (1) during this period some retail companies’ stock prices went up 
substantially, (2) the retailing sector outperformed the S&P 500, and (3) despite doing well on 
the stock market, large numbers of retailers went bankrupt. 
Wal-Mart, Gap, and Circuit City, as noted earlier, performed extremely well; an investment 
in these companies made on December 31, 1978 would have increased more than a hundred-fold 
by December 31, 1997. Circuit City maintained a compound annual growth rate of 34% over this 
19-year period. Many other retail stocks also performed well, 47.5% of the companies for which 
stock market data was available achieving higher annual returns than the S&P 500. 
To evaluate the entire retail portfolio relative to the broader market we designed a “retail 
investment strategy” (details are in Appendix 1).  Using this strategy, the annualized internal 
rate of return on the retail portfolio is 21.94%, on the S&P 500 portfolio 11.35%, and on the 
value-weighted market index portfolio 15.14%.  
But the retail portfolio, although it performed better than the broader portfolios during this 
period, also exhibits a wider disparity between companies compared to the corresponding $1 
investments made in the other two portfolios. The highest return for a retail company was more 
than 75% per year (for a company with two and a half years of data), the lowest -81.6% per year 
(for a company with two years of data). Only 46% of the retail companies beat the value-
weighted market index, even though retail stocks performed substantially better than market 
indices. Moreover, the stock market success experienced by many retailers notwithstanding, a 
substantial number of retailers went bankrupt during this period. Of 293 companies that were 
public between 1978 and 1997, 112 were de-listed and at least 50 went bankrupt.  
The mixed fortunes of retail stocks during the 1978-1997 period saw some extraordinarily 
successful retailers create some of the wealthiest people in the world (e.g., Sam Walton of 
Wal-Mart), and roughly 17% of retail firms file for bankruptcy. 
Characterizing Variations in Operational Measures  
such as ROA, ROE, Gross Margin, and Inventory Turns 
 
Using data captured in public financial statements, we address a number of questions that are 
frequently raised about cross-industry and within-industry differences.  
 
· Sample cross-industry questions.  Are fashion apparel retailers more profitable than 
grocery retailers? Does consumer electronics grow faster than other retail segments? Do 
department store chains have lower inventory turns and higher gross margins than other 
retail segments? Are there systematic differences between various retail industry 
segments? 
 
· Sample within-industry questions.  Within the same industry segment, do firms with high 
gross margins have low inventory turns? Do firms with higher gross margins spend more 
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on selling expenses? Do firms that try to grow rapidly over a short period of time earn 
lower rates of return on assets? Are some strategies consistently more profitable than 
others? 
 
Measures that remain stable from one industry to another can be used to benchmark the 
performance of different firms within an industry segment. We identify tradeoffs among the 
different components that constitute these measures.  
Figure 2 presents a simplified view of an income statement and balance sheet that emphasize 
the principal variables of interest in this paper.  We compute from these income statement and 
balance sheet figures return on assets, sales growth, and other management measures 
(mathematical definitions are provided in Table 1). 
Results presented in this section are for the five-year period 1994-1998. By restricting our 
analysis to these five years, we were able to obtain a larger number of firms with complete 
history of data. Relatively few firms were public during the 1978-1998, the entire period for 
which we obtained data.  
ROA, sales growth, ROE, and financial leverage do not vary across segments 
 
We find that return on assets, sales growth, return on equity, and financial leverage do not 
vary systematically from one industry to another. Using the analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
approach to discern industry differences, we classify companies into various segments (e.g., 
consumer electronics, apparel, and supermarkets) and evaluate the statistical significance of 
differences in performance measures by comparing the differences between segments with the 
differences within each segment. For example, we would conclude that sales growth rates for 
apparel retailers were much higher than sales growth rates for supermarkets if the difference in 
growth rates between the apparel and supermarket segments was substantially higher than the 
variation in growth rates among the companies within each segment. Details of the ANOVA 
approach can be found in a statistics textbook.3 
We fail to find systematic differences in sales growth, ROA, ROE, financial leverage, and 
stock market returns from one segment to another. In other words, sales growth, ROA, and ROE 
are similar in the different retail sectors from 1978 to 1997, suggesting that retailers in different 
industry segments were able to achieve comparable levels of profitability as measured by both 
ROA and by ROE. Moreover, we find that they had similar financial leverage ratios. Table 2 
presents statistical results that test the hypothesis that a particular performance variable varies 
from one industry to another. Table 3 presents average values for some of the variables for each 
industry segment. The F-values in Table 2, for the effect of industry on sales growth, ROA,  
ROE, and stock market returns , are not significant. It is not surprising that ROA or ROE would 
                                                                 
3 For example, Business Statistics: Decision Making with Data, Richard Johnson and Dean W. Wichern, John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc., 1997. 
 5 
not vary from one retail segment to another. Assuming limited entry and exit barriers, segments 
with higher ROE would attract competitors until returns were equalized, segments with low ROE 
see some companies exit, leaving the remaining companies with higher ROE.  Inasmuch as 
financial leverage is found not to differ significantly among retail segments, our argument 
transfers to ROA as well. 
Although aggregate measures such as ROA, ROE, and sales growth do not vary significantly 
between retail segments, the components of return on assets do vary between and within industry 
segments. Table 3 presents average values for a variety of measures including gross margins, 
SGA expenses, GMROI, and inventory turns. Retailers with stable, predictable demand and long 
product lifecycles, such as grocery, drugs, and convenience stores, have better “efficiency ratios” 
(asset turns and inventory turns) than other retailers. On the other hand, retailers of short 
lifecycle products such as apparel, shoes, electronics, jewelry, toys, and so forth, tend to have 
higher gross margins and lower efficiency ratios than other retailers. PC retailers such as 
CompUSA are exceptions, having low gross margins and high turns while selling short lifecycle 
products.   
Gross margins, inventory turns, and SG&A expenses vary within and between 
segments  
 
We examine the relationship between the two components of ROE first in terms of the 
relationship between gross margin and inventory turns, and then in terms of the relationship 
between SG&A and gross margins. Intuitively, we would expect relationships between some of 
these component metrics.  
The following equation specifies the various components of ROE.  
 
ROE  = [(Gross Profit-SGA)/Equity] 
= [Gross Profit/Inventory]* [Inventory/Assets]* 
[Assets/Equity]*[(Gross Profit-SGA)/Gross Profit] 
 = [GMROII]*[Assets/Equity]*[Inventory Intensity]*[SGA Intensity] 
  
Anticipating roughly similar ROE measures for different retailers, all else remaining equal, a 
change in any of the component metrics on the right side of the foregoing equation would be 
expected to result in a compensating change in some other component metric. For example, a 
retailer with higher gross margins would experience a compensating change in some other 
component (e.g., inventory intensity) in order to yield an ROE similar to other retailers. We used 
our public financial data to evaluate two compensating relationships that can be hypothesized on 
the basis of the foregoing equation. 
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Gross margin and inventory turns 
We would intuitively expect gross margin and inventory turns to be inversely related, that is, 
retailers with higher gross margins to achieve lower inventory turns. A retailer that carries a unit 
of product longer before selling it (i.e., a retailer with slower inventory turns) would expect to 
earn substantially more on its inventory investment than a retailer that carries the inventory item 
for a shorter period. For example, Tandy, a retailer that turns its inventory less than twice a year, 
should realize higher gross margins on each sale than a retailer such as CompUSA, which turns 
its inventory more than eight times per year. Retailers such as Tandy are said to be following the 
“profit path” (i.e., earning high profit with each sale), retailers such as CompUSA the “turnover 
path” (i.e., earning small profits with each sale, doing so quickly after making an inventory 
investment). 
Figure 3 plots the relationship between gross margin and inventory turns for consumer 
electronics retailers and suggests a logarithmic model. Hence, we conduct regression using the 
following equation: 
 log (Inventory Turns i ) = Ks + b log (Gross Marginsi ) + e i 
 
Table 4 presents the estimation results. 
Note that we do not imply causality in this relationship. That is, the model does not imply 
that if a firm increases its gross margin through better management its inventory turns will 
decline commensurately. Instead, we propose that the covariance between gross margin and 
inventory turns is a function of their mutual dependence on the characteristics of a retailer’s 
business.  
Gross margin and SG&A expenses 
Intuitively, we would expect a retailer with high gross margins to have higher SG&A 
expenses. The intuition behind this hypothesis can be explained in three ways. One, we would 
expect a retailer with higher advertising and promotion expenses (components of SG&A 
expenses) to be able to charge higher prices and, hence, achieve higher gross margins. Two, we 
would expect ROE to be roughly equal in various retail segments, a relationship that can be 
generated if increases in gross margins are accompanied by increases in SG&A.  Three, we 
would expect the relationship due to a quirk in retail accounting procedures. Retailers are often 
classified into two broad categories. One category includes retailers that generate traffic, and 
hence, spend a considerable amount of money on advertising and promotion. These retailers 
have high SG&A expenses, but also generate high gross margins. A traditional department store 
such as Federated or May Company fits this category. The second category includes retailers that 
locate in high-traffic areas (e.g., mall locations) and incur high real-estate costs. These costs are 
included in CGS, and hence, reduce gross margin. These retailers typically incur low advertising 
and promotion expenses because they rely on the mall for traffic. Thus, they have lower SG&A 
costs.  A mall-based retailer such as The Limited fits this category. 
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Figure 4 plots the results of the empirical test, which demonstrate a strong relationship 
between gross margin and SG&A expenses. Estimates from the regression are shown in the best-
fit equation below the figure. The extremely high R-square of 80% suggests that a substantial 
portion of the variation in gross margin can be explained by the variation in SG&A expenses.  
Inasmuch as different types of retailers are able to achieve similar ROE performance by very 
different strategies with regard to gross margin, selling expenses, and inventory turns, knowledge 
of the relationships among these components of ROE can facilitate comparisons across retailers 
useful to both retailers and investors. 
Relating Stock Returns and Operational Measures 
 
We now show that ROA and sales growth have a positive association, and standard deviation 
of return on assets, ROAs , a negative association, with long-term stock returns. Together, these 
three variables—ROA, sales growth, and ROAs —explain more than 50% of the variation in stock 
returns for all the data we have analyzed thus far. We compare this result with the impact of 
return on equity on stock returns, ROE being a measure of net profitability that is widely used by 
managers and researchers. Finally, we find that GMROII, like ROA, also has a positive 
correlation with stock returns, but the extent of association is much lower. 
We use the compounded annual stock return realized by a firm’s investors over a 10-year 
period, a measure used by both managers and investors to evaluate how successful a firm has 
been over a given time period, but we do not adjust the return for the firm’s risk profile, even 
though it is apparent that a 20% stock return achieved by a low risk firm might not be 
comparable to a 20% stock return achieved by a high risk firm. Details of an approach for 
adjusting stock market returns for different levels of risk are described in Appendix 2. 
We test the relationship between stock return and ROA, sales growth, and ROAs  by fitting the 
following linear regression equation to the available data. 
 ii4iROA3i2i10i DE)(gROAR ebsbbbb +++++=  Equation 1 
Here iR  denotes average stock returns over some long time period for firm i , iROA  average 
return on assets for firm i , ig  its average sales growth rate, iDE  its debt-equity ratio, and 
iROA)(s  the standard deviation of return on assets. We include debt-equity ratio in order to have 
a completely specified model since leverage could also be expected to have an effect on stock 
returns.  The error in fitting the equation is ie .  
The best-fit equation obtained from applying the model to all 19 years of data is:  
 
iiiROAiii )DE*19.3())(*52.1( )g*51.0()ROA*64.0(58.10R es +--++=  
The resulting 2R  was 0.67. The three management measures considered in the model—ROA, 
growth rate, and ROAs —thus explain 67% of the variation in stock market returns. Table 5 
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shows the tests for statistical significance on each coefficient. Similar analyses using different 
time intervals with the same underlying data yielded similar results. Table 5 presents the results 
of these analyses as well. 
Managers have often wondered if their attempts to improve operations are rewarded by Wall 
Street analysts. Many managers, including some CEOs, have, in private conversations with us, 
bemoaned the lack of operational savvy among stock market analysts. Moreover, many supply 
chain and operational improvement ideas, because they involve inter-organization and inter-
functional coordination, require the involvement of the CEO and other senior managers. Many 
middle managers have emphasized to us that this task is difficult because, in the words of one:  
“My CEO is concerned with stock price, not operational changes.”  
Supply chain managers can and often do overcome this challenge by estimating the costs and 
benefits associated with lower inventory levels, fill rate, and so forth in order to quantify the 
impact of operational changes on a firm’s bottom line. We present an alternative approach.  Our 
analysis enables managers to evaluate the impact of operational changes on shareholder wealth. 
Consider the following example based on data obtained from Best Buy’s financial statements. 
During the years 1985 to 1997 (the years between 1978 and 1997 when the company was public) 
Best Buy had average gross margins of 16.7% of sales, operating margins of 3.05%, asset turns 
of 4.06%, average ROA of 12.4%, and annual stock-price appreciation of 22.5%. It also 
experienced significant problems maintaining product availability at its stores. Noted one 
analyst:  “Over the past three years, the company's [Best Buy’s] in-stock percentage on a rolling 
12-month basis has never been much above 75%, despite numerous efforts to improve it.”4   
Assume that Best Buy’s managers identify process and systems improvement that would 
boost in-stock availability during each of these years from 75% to 85% without an increase in 
assets or expenses, a reasonable target for many supply-chain improvement projects. The gross 
margins associated with additional sales would fall to the bottom-line, increasing ROA from 
12.4% to 21.5% and, correspondingly, based on our equation, drive annual stock returns from 
22.5% per year to 28.3% per year. 5 
This represents a dramatic shift in stock market valuation; a $1 million investment in 1985 
would have appreciated to $11.4 million by 1997 at 22.5% per year and to $19.9 million at 
28.3% per year. Even more dramatic, had Best Buy been public during all 19 years a $1 million 
investment in 1978 would, by 1997, have appreciated to $47 million at 22.5% per year and to 
$114 million at 28.1% per year. 
We also compared the performance of the model presented in equation 3 with two other 
models. First, using ROE and sales growth rate to explain stock market return, we found that the 
model we proposed and tested in equation 1 explains as much of the variation in stock returns as 
                                                                 
4 Salomon Brothers Inc. Investors’ Report, June 13, 1996. 
5 From the equation es +--++= )DE*19.3())(*52.1( )g*51.0()ROA*64.0(58.10R iiROAiii , we see that if 
ROA increases from 0.124 to 0.215, then we would expect Ri to increase by 0.64*(0.215 – 0.124) = 0.05824.  Thus, 
R would rise from 22.5% to 28.3%.   
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do ROE and sales growth. Another model that used GMROII, growth rate, and financial leverage 
to predict stock market returns performed worse than our current model (i.e., it explained a 
smaller percentage of the differences in stock market returns), which is not surprising given that 
GMROII is but one component of return on assets. Good performance by a retailer on GMROII 
does not imply good operating profitability since the retailer might be incurring 
disproportionately high selling expenses or have too small an investment in inventory (low 
inventory to assets ratio). 
Finally, we investigated whether our three measures of operating performance—ROA, 
growth rate, and ROAs —could be used to explain the risk-adjusted stock market return based on 
the research by Fama and French (summarized in Appendix 2). We found that operating 
performance explained risk-adjusted returns as well as it explained annual stock returns.  
Guiding the CEO in Maximizing Shareholder Wealth 
 
Our goal was to educate managers about the relationship between measures they can 
influence (e.g., ROA and sales growth) and stock market returns. By quantifying these 
relationships, we offer CEOs a tool for relating their project choices to shareholder wealth.  It is 
surprising that such a tool has only now been developed. 
CEOs in retailing, like those in other industries, must constantly allocate monetary and 
people resources to departments and projects.  Projects typically differ along various dimensions 
(e.g., resources required, expected payoff or impact on various management measures, 
uncertainty surrounding the payoff, and time elapsed before the payoffs are derived).  Decisions 
about which projects to pursue should be at least partially driven by a project’s projected impact 
on shareholder wealth.  Our analysis enables retailers to compare and evaluate different projects 
by quantifying the impact of changing management measures on stock market valuation.  Given 
the high rate of bankruptcy in retailing, it is understandable that CEOs’ project choices are also 
influenced by bankruptcy risk, a CEO facing a high risk of bankruptcy, for example, would seek 
investments that have shorter, more certain payoffs. 
The analysis presented here needs to be replicated for other industries (e.g., manufacturers 
and distributors). The issues we addressed in this paper are similar to those faced by senior 
managers in many industries. The results we present here are unique to retailing, but our 
methodology applies much more broadly.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Retail Investment Strategy 
 
This appendix describes an investment strategy that can be used to compare the performance 
of the retailing sector with broader indices such as the S&P 500. 
Assume that an investor invests from December 1978 to December 1997 in three portfolios:  
a portfolio of retail stocks; an S&P 500 index portfolio; and a value-weighted market index 
portfolio (where market includes all stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ). On 
December 31, 1978 the investor invests $1 in every public listed retail stock and an equivalent 
amount in the other two portfolios. For any retail company listed on the stock market after 
December 1978, the investor buys $1 of stock in the first month of trading and adds $1 to each of 
the two index portfolios.  For any retail company de-listed from the exchange, the investor 
recuperates all investment in the last month of trading at the current price and simultaneously 
recuperates the present value of $1 that had been invested in each of the other two portfolios at 
the time of investing in the de-listed company. At the end of the investment horizon, December 
1997, the investor closes the three portfolios and sells all shares. At this time, we compute the 
internal rates of return of the time-series of cash flows for the three portfolios. These three rates 
of return can be compared because the investment strategy has been designed to control for the 
unequal lengths of investment periods in different retail companies.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Use of the 3-factor Fama and French Model to Compute 
Risk-adjusted Stock Returns  
 
The risk-adjusted stock return, or “unexpected stock return,” is computed using the “3-factor 
model” proposed by Fama and French. Essentially, this method controls for three non-
diversifiable risk factors identified by Fama and French: excess return on the market portfolio; 
difference between the return on small cap and large cap stocks; and difference between return 
on high book-to-market and low book-to-market stocks.6  The returns not explained by a model 
containing these three factors are considered as unexpected or risk-adjusted returns.  
Let Rit denote the monthly stock return for firm i in month t obtained from CRSP time-series 
records, Rmt denote the value-weighted market return over month t, and Rft  denote the risk-free 
return over month t obtained on 1-month T-bills. According to Fama and French (1993), the 
expected return on a portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate [E(Rit) - Rft] is explained by the 
sensitivity of its return to three factors:  the excess return on a broad market portfolio (Rmt - Rft); 
the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of 
large stocks (SMBt  small minus big); and the difference between the return on a portfolio of 
high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HMLt 
high minus low). Here, the value-weighted market index is based on NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ. The portfolios of small stocks, large stocks, high book-to-market stocks and low-
book-to-market stocks have been constructed by Fama and French. Thus, the values of SMBt and 
HMLt are available from their database. Once we have monthly closing stock prices (adjusted for 
dividends and splits) for a retailer and monthly time-series values of the three factors over some 
period, we can estimate this model for the given company using the following regression 
equation. 
 
Rit - Rft = ai + b i1 (Rmt - Rft) + b i2 SMBt + b i3 HMLt + e it 
 
If the firm had no abnormal return, the intercept, ai,  in this regression should be zero. Thus, 
the unexpected or risk-adjusted return for firm i is defined as the intercept ai obtained from the 
regression. 
                                                                 
6 Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, 1993, “Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds,” Journal 
of Financial Economics, vol. 33, pp. 3-56. 
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Figure 1 
 
Histogram of Average Annual Stock Returns of Retail Firms during 1978-1997 
 
(Data: 293 firms that had at least 2 years of stock return history) 
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Figure 2 
 
Simplified View of Income Statement and Balance Sheet 
 
(a) Income Statement 
 
   Notation Amount ($) 
Sales (net of markdowns) S 100  
Cost of Goods Sold  CGS (60) 
 (includes Occupancy and Distribution  
Costs) 
 
Gross Profit   40  
Selling, General & Administrative Expenses SGA (20) 
Operating Profit  EBITDA 20  
Depreciation & Amortization Expenses  (5) 
Interest Costs   (6) 
Profit Before Tax  PBT 9  
Taxes    (4) 
Net Profit  PAT 5  
 
 
(b) Balance Sheet 
 
Assets  Liabilities 
Fixed Assets FA 30  Owner's Equity OE 40 
 (includes Owned Property  
and Capitalized Leases) 
(includes Retained  
Earnings) 
Cash   15      
Inventory  Inv 45  Long-term Debt LTD 20 
Accounts Receivable  10  Accounts Payable  40 
Total Assets TA 100  Total Liabilities  100 
 
 14 
Figure 3 
 
Plot of Annual Inventory Turns and Gross Margin for all Consumer Electronics Retailers 
for the Period 1994 to 1998 
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Note: The smooth line shows the fitted equation for the consumer electronics segment, 
log IT = –0.016 – 1.038 log GM. 
The R2 for the regression across all segments is 51.82%. 
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Figure 4 
 
Plot of Annual Gross Margin and SGA Expenses for all Consumer Electronics Retailers for 
the Period 1994 to 1998 
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Note: The straight line shows the fitted equation for the consumer electronics segment, 
GM = 0.032 + 1.036 SGA 
 The R2 across all segments is 74.73%. 
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Table 1 
Definition of Accounting Statements-based Performance Measures 
 
Return on Equity (%)  ( ) 2/1 tt
t
t OEOE
PAT
RoE
+
=
-
 
Return on Assets (%)  ( ) 2/1 tt
t
t TATA
EBITDA
RoA
+
=
-
 
Components of Return on Assets: 
Operating Margin (%)  
t
t
t S
EBITDA
OM =  
Gross Margin (%)  
t
tt
t
t S
CGSS
S
GM
-
== t
Profit Gross
 
Total Asset Turns (ratio)  ( ) 2/1 tt
t
t TATA
S
AT
+
=
-
 
Inventory Turns (ratio)  ( ) 2/1 tt
t
t InvInv
S
IT
+
=
-
 
Gross Margin Return on Inventory (%) ( ) tttt
tt
t ITGMInvInv
CGSS
GMRoI ´=
+
-
=
- 2/1
 
Break-up of Return on Assets into Component Measures: 
( )t
t
t
t
t
tt
tt
t
t
t
ttt
ofitGross
SGA
GMRoI
IT
TATA
InvInv
ofitGross
SGA
GM
ATOMRoA
Ratio Assets toInventory 
Pr 
1
Pr 
1
1
1
´÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-´=
´÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+
+
´÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-´=
´=
-
-  
 
 
“%” implies metric is represented as a percentage (e.g., 53% instead of 0.53).  
“Ratio” implies metric is represented as a fraction (e.g., 0.53 instead of 53%).  
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Table 2 
 
Estimation of Industry Effect on Various Model Variables  
Using Two Factor ANOVA Models 
yist = a i + b s + e ist 
 
where i and s are firm and industry segment indices, respectively. The regression has two sets of 
independent variables: an indicator variable for each firm, and an indicator variable for each 
industry segment. 
 
Number of industry segments for each model variable: 11 
Number of firms: 153 
 
 
Variable Across Industry 
Sum of Squares 
Within Industry 
Sum of Squares 
R-Square 
(%) 
F-statistic p-value 
Gross Margin 0.2853 1.2527 18.55 3.2336 0.0009*** 
SGA Expenses 0.2665 0.9617 21.70 3.9070 0.0001*** 
Inventory Turns 1015.8270 1951.8770 34.23 7.3902 0.0000*** 
GMROII 85.2139 233.3579 26.75 5.1853 0.0000*** 
ROA 0.0805 0.9016 8.20 1.2676 0.2543 
ROE 5.7582 59.8222 8.78 1.3668 0.2015 
Sales Growth 0.2056 3.5237 5.51 0.8284 0.6020 
Stock Returns 0.8842 8.3682 9.56 1.5004 0.1450 
 
 
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 3 
 
Average Values of Some of the Variables in the Study for Each Industry Segment 
(Time period: 1994-98; Total number of firms: 153) 
 
SIC Industry Name 
Number of 
Firms 
Average Sales 
($ million) 
Segment  
Growth 
(%) 
Inventory 
Turns 
Gross 
Margin 
(%) 
SGA 
Expenses 
(%) GMROII 
ROA 
(%) 
ROE 
(%) 
5311 Department Stores 12 5,994.1 11.08 3.38 34.71 28.54 1.13 11.66 17.95 
5331 Variety Stores 14 14,186.2 9.35 3.89 27.87 23.18 0.99 13.39 13.17 
5400, 5411 Food Stores 26 5,310.0 7.34 9.94 27.94 22.35 2.75 14.99 8.93 
5600-5699 Apparel And Accessory Stores 41 1,180.5 8.04 4.27 35.93 27.92 1.47 16.18 11.15 
5700 Home Furniture & Equip Store 12 591.5 13.09 4.89 40.81 35.46 2.18 11.64 8.45 
5731 
Radio,TV, Consumer 
Electronics Stores 
10 2,689.6 12.37 4.38 27.53 23.81 1.07 10.53 6.23 
5900 Miscellaneous Retail 6 192.1 0.86 7.04 35.42 24.72 2.15 12.86 10.26 
5912 Drug & Proprietary Stores 7 3,379.9 14.77 4.65 28.62 23.51 1.28 8.29 3.67 
5944 Jewelry Stores 6 671.3 7.48 1.33 52.65 41.41 0.70 12.56 12.92 
5945 Hobby, Toy, And Game Shops 5 2,340.3 6.96 3.11 36.24 31.61 1.12 10.95 3.38 
5961 Catalog, Mail-Order Houses 14 703.9 6.93 6.44 36.21 32.42 1.83 9.55 0.03 
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Table 4: Estimation of the Interrelationship between Inventory Turns and Gross Margin 
 
 
Results of ANOVA (R2 = 51.82%, F-statistic = 38.05 significant at 0.0001) 
 
Source 
Degrees of 
Freedom Type III SS 
Mean 
Square F Value Pr > F 
Segment 10 12.1317 1.2132 5.99 0.0001 
logGM*Segment 11 49.4609 4.4964 22.19 0.0001 
 
Parameter Estimates by Retailing Segment 
 
as  bs 
Parameter 
Estimate Standard 
Error 
t-statistic p-value  Estimate Standard 
Error 
t-statistic p-value 
Apparel And Accessory Stores 0.626 0.2303 0.80 0.4251  -0.691 0.1250 -5.53 0.0001 
Catalog, Mail-Order Houses 0.643 0.2277 0.88 0.3784  -0.903 0.1066 -8.48 0.0001 
Department Stores 0.857 0.2504 1.65 0.0984  -0.293 0.1401 -2.09 0.0372 
Drug & Proprietary Stores -0.449 0.5001 -1.78 0.0750  -1.444 0.3595 -4.02 0.0001 
Food Stores 1.621 0.3277 3.60 0.0003  -0.469 0.2063 -2.27 0.0234 
Hobby, Toy, And Game Shops 0.403 0.6463 -0.06 0.9513  -0.641 0.5968 -1.07 0.2830 
Home Furniture & Equip Store 0.627 0.3775 0.49 0.6242  -0.716 0.3555 -2.01 0.0443 
Jewelry Stores -0.418 0.2674 -3.22 0.0013  -1.046 0.1467 -7.13 0.0001 
Miscellaneous Retail 1.219 0.3641 2.13 0.0333  -0.585 0.2430 -2.41 0.0163 
Radio, TV, Consumer Electronics Stores -0.016 0.3173 -1.45 0.1488  -1.038 0.1850 -5.61 0.0001 
Variety Stores 0.442 0.1861 2.38 0.0177  -0.636 0.1332 -4.77 0.0001 
 
 
elog logs ssi si siIT a b GM= + +
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Table 5 
 
Results of Regression of Stock Returns on  
ROA, Sales Growth, Sigma ROA and DE Ratio 
 
 
 
 
Parameter Estimates Time Period Number 
of Firms 
R-square 
Intercept ROA Sales 
Growth 
Sigma 
ROA 
DE Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
          
19 yrs 1979-97 32 0.67 
 
10.58 
 
0.64b 0.51a -1.52a -3.19 5.53 
15 yrs 1983-97 35 0.72 
 
-2.17 
 
1.02a 0.48a -0.75c 3.54 5.09 
1979-88 42 0.38 
 
10.12 
 
1.13a - -1.82a 5.99c 10.91 10 yrs 
1988-97 59 0.53 
 
-14.51a 0.99a 0.34a -0.006 4.54c 6.68 
1979-83 81 0.35 
 
7.23 
 
0.83a 0.57a -0.62 3.02 13.42 
1983-87 49 0.53 
 
-12.75 
 
1.45a 1.19a 1.33 19.64a 16.83 
1988-92 69 0.47 
 
-13.99a 0.98a 0.72a -0.44 -0.85 12.93 
5 yrs 
1993-97 93 0.35 
 
-16.91a 
 
1.41a 0.29a -0.80 4.79c 14.22 
 
asignificant at 99%  bsignificant at 98%  csignificant at 95% 
 
Sales growth was not used as an independent variable for 1979-88 because of collinearity with 
ROA. 
 
